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Mathematicians study shapes, structures and patterns. However, there
are shapes, structures and patterns within the body and practice of math-
ematics that are not the direct objects of mathematical study. Rather,
they are part of the explanation of how mathematical study is possible, and
thus demand the attention of epistemologists and phenomenologists as well
as mathematicians. Partial philosophical accounts of these enabling struc-
tures include heuristic in the senses of Polya and Lakatos; principles in the
sense of Cassirer; ideas in the sense of Lautman and notions in the sense
of Grattan-Guinness (Polya, 1954; Lakatos, 1976; Cassirer, 1956; Lautman,
2006; Grattan-Guinness, 2008). The study of these structures lies in the
intersection of mathematics and philosophy because some of these shapes,
structures and patterns may eventually submit to mathematical treatment,
but others may have a ‘Protean’ quality that will always escape formal
treatment.
The examples given here are heterogeneous in their origins and func-
tions. Cassirer and Grattan-Guinness find their principles and notions (re-
spectively) in applied mathematics and empirical science.1 Lautman sought
the same ideas (in his Platonic sense of ‘idea’) in mathematics and physics,
though he looked longer and harder in pure mathematics than in physics
(this doctrine, that mathematics and physics have a common root, is part
of his Platonism). The heuristic patterns in Lakatos and Polya are more
closely specific to pure mathematics, though this may be an artefact of
their contingent mathematical interests. Regarding function, heuristic pat-
terns are not necessarily the deepest of these shapes, precisely because they
are evident before (or at least during) mathematical investigation, whereas
Lautman’s Platonic ideas typically come into view late in the day, when
they are instantiated in several different mathematical theories. Cassirer’s
principles and Grattan-Guinness’ notions seem to be intermediate, hav-
ing both heuristic and ontological significance (reading ‘ontological’ here in
something like Lautman’s Platonic-Heideggerian sense).
The aim of this paper is not to undertake the large task of classifying
and comparing these various kinds of enabling structures. Rather it is to
1Cassirer also gives an example of a principle in mathematics—the use of groups. I
am grateful to David Corfield for this point, among others.
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explore two kinds of pattern that are, I shall suggest, unique to mathemat-
ics: syntactic analogy and generalisation by extension. I hope thereby to
illustrate some of the contrasts that such a classification would require.
1 Syntactic analogy
Mathematicians prior to Leibniz had already begun to reap the benefits of
operating with mathematical expressions without waiting to find out what
they mean. As early as 1545, Cardano calculated with complex numbers,
though he could not use them in his proofs and had no way of understand-
ing them. The development of symbolic algebra in the early decades of the
seventeenth century introduced a distinction between the syntax of mathe-
matical notation and the meanings of mathematical symbols. This allowed
mathematicians to work with the syntax first and then, later, make sense
of the new expressions it gave them. Of course, this gave rise to a debate
among mathematicians about the value and reliability of results obtained
this way. It was Leibniz who turned these ad hoc devices into something like
a programme of research. He experimented with many new symbols in ad-
dition to those he introduced that are still in use today (see Cajori, 1925).
When the mathematician Tschirnhausen objected to these typographical
novelties, Leibniz reminded him that Arabic numerals had once been new,
as had letters standing for numbers. Leibniz continued:
In signs one observes an advantage in discovery which is greatest when
they express the exact nature of a thing briefly and, as it were, pic-
ture it; then indeed the labour of thought is wonderfully diminished.
(Gerhardt, 1899, vol I, p. 375); (Cajori, 1925, p. 416).
This advantage is not unique to mathematics; other discourses have no-
tions that ‘picture’ the relationships among the elements of their objects.
Chemical formulae picture the relations among the elements that constitute
molecules. However, in chemistry, the relata matter. We would not suppose
that H2O and Ag2F (silver subfluoride) must be, on some level, the same
stuff just because their formulae picture the same relations between their
elements. In contrast, mathematics abstracts from the relata, the better to
study the relations. If two mathematical structures are isomorphic, then for
many mathematical purposes they are identical. Therefore, if two mathe-
matical formulae (in Leibniz’s words) ‘express briefly and as it were, picture’
the ‘exact natures’ of their referents, and the formulae are isomorphic, then
we should expect the referents to be, at some level of description, identical
(or at least, systematically related).
A well-known example from Leibniz illustrates this point. In a letter to
Johann Bernoulli of October 1695, Leibniz proposed his general formula for
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repeated differentiation of a product.2 He started with Newton’s binomial
formula:
(x+ y)n = xny0 + nxn−1y +
n(n− 1)
1 · 2 x
n−2y2 + . . .+ x0yn
Notice the inclusion of x0 and y0 to perfect the homogeneity, and thus
the ‘harmony’, of the expression. Leibniz rewrote it as follows, with expo-
nentiation treated as an operator, denoted by ‘p’:
pn(x+ y) = pnxp0y + npn−1xp1y +
n(n− 1)
1 · 2 p
n−2xp2y + . . .+ p0xpny
Now Leibniz made a pair of inspired substitutions. He replaced the sum
on the left hand side with a product and replaced the ‘p’s (for ‘power’)
by ‘d’s (for ‘differential’). This gave him the general product formula for
differentiation:
dn(xy) = dnxd0y + ndn−1xd1y +
n(n− 1)
1 · 2 d
n−2xd2y + . . .+ d0xdny
It is not clear what inspired Leibniz to make precisely these substitutions
(note the insight necessary to replace sum by product on the left hand side
only). Nor can we tell quite how much confidence he placed in this formula
before he tested it. We do know that Leibniz must have considered this
procedure respectable, because otherwise he would not have shared it with
Bernoulli. What is clear is that the simple heuristic of reading dydx as a
quotient of infinitesimals does not, alone, lead to this result.
As he was unable to prove many of his most important results, Leibniz
did have to rely on a combination of corroboration from successful applica-
tions and faith that similarities in syntax indicate a common structure. A
modern mathematical eye may find irrationality in Leibniz’s willingness to
rely on syntactic similarities of this sort.3 After all, the trick works only if
the ‘signs’ do indeed express the ‘nature of the thing’ perfectly—but if in
any given case we know that, then we probably do not need to appeal to fea-
tures of the notational syntax at all. Leibniz’s confidence in his procedure
2(Gerhardt, 1863, vol. III, p. 221); (Coe, 1950, p. 459). Cf. also (Serfati, 2005, pp. 389–
390).
3“The play of symbols can thus seem opposed, not only to usage, but also, in a certain
sense, to rationality” (“Le jeu combinatoire peut ainsi sembler s’opposer, non seulement a`
l’usage, mais aussi, en un certain sens, a` la rationalite´.”) (Serfati, 2005, p. 390). Strictly
speaking, the status of ‘knowledge’ belongs to results that the mathematical community
accepts into the common canon, so judgments of epistemic rationality attach properly to
the practice of whole communities of mathematicians rather than of individuals.
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arises from his rationalism, and specifically from the metaphysical principle
that ‘harmony’ is an indication of reality (because maximal harmony is one
of the merits of the best of all possible worlds). This is the mood, familiar
from Pythagoras and Plato, in which rationalism becomes mystical. In any
case, the mathematical community did not collectively share Leibniz’s ra-
tionalism, knew that proofs and explanations were lacking and (eventually)
supplied them.
Notice the difference between this case and the many structural analo-
gies in empirical science. Take, for example, Rutherford’s planetary model
of the atom. This captures some gross features of atoms—the massy centre
orbited by (relatively) tiny specks, and the emptiness of almost all of the
space ‘occupied’ by an atom. But no-one would suppose that atoms and
solar systems are instances of the same general phenomenon. The gross
similarities sustain nothing more than a rough analogy. By contrast, the
common binomial form of Newton and Leibniz’s formulae, as ‘pictured’ in
the notation, suggests that they are both instances of a single mathemat-
ical structure. Certainly, it is reasonable (even without sharing Leibniz’s
metaphysics) to seek a mathematical explanation of their common binomial
form (for which cf. Coe, 1950). The reason is obvious: mathematics studies
phenomena ‘up to isomorphism’—including, especially, mathematical phe-
nomena. If the notation in each of two cases ‘expresses the exact nature of
the thing briefly and, as it were, pictures it’, and if there is an isomorphism
between the notations, then we should expect to find a level of description
where the two phenomena appear as instances of a common mathematical
structure. In empirical science, a notational isomorphism would not de-
mand an explanation of the same sort. Isomorphisms between formulae in
(say) mechanics and economics might suggest a heuristically useful anal-
ogy, but they would not prompt a search for a common genus (unless the
formulae were abstracted from their empirical origins and treated as purely
mathematical objects). This intimacy between mathematical objects and
mathematical notation is unique to mathematics and reflects its nature as
the science of structures.
Leibniz was probably the first mathematician to work in this way, but
by no means the last. In 1861, John Blissard introduced a general method
of this sort. Blissard’s technique was to take identities involving sequences
of polynomials with powers an, and create new expressions by changing the
polynomials to discrete values and replacing the an with the falling factorial
(a)n ≡ a(a − 1) . . . (a − n + 1). Many of the resulting identities are both
true and interesting. Sylvester named this method the ‘umbral calculus’ be-
cause the newly generated identities are ‘shadows’ of the generating identi-
ties. In the 1970s, Steven Roman and Gian-Carlo Rota developed Blissard’s
idea rigorously and offered a mathematical explanation of the successes it
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brought to Blissard, Sylvester and others (Roman, 1984). Beyond pure
mathematics, there are mathematical practitioners who routinely exploit
syntactic (or ‘formal’) likenesses. Cartier observes that “For the physicists,
[the word ‘formal’] is more or less synonymous with ‘heuristic’ as opposed
to ‘rigorous”’. Cartier goes on to give a survey of mathematics conducted in
this ‘formal’ spirit (including a detailed discussion of the Leibniz’s formula;
Cartier, 2000, p. 4).
In terms of our wider enquiry, we have here a pattern with two features.
First, it offers a general heuristic rule: where there is a structural similar-
ity between two mathematical expressions, seek a corresponding structural
similarity between the mathematical matters they express. Second, we can
articulate this pattern almost entirely in mathematical terms. Where Leib-
niz wrote of ‘picturing’, we can express our rule in terms of isomorphisms,
understood literally in the usual mathematical sense.
For the sake of contrast, I turn now to a pattern that lacks these two
features.
2 Impossible extensions
These are cases in which a function is defined for some limited range of
values in such a way that an extension beyond that range seems impossible.
To take one of the simplest and earliest examples, Descartes popularised the
current exponential notation ax, to indicate x multiples of a (though he was
not the first to use this notation).4 This notation abbreviated the previous
practice of writing a3 (for example) as aaa. Thus defined, exponentiation
requires x to be a natural number, but nothing in this syntax inhibits us from
replacing x by a negative number, a fraction or a complex number.5 In these
cases, it is relatively straightforward to extend the domain of a function.
For example, power series allowed mathematicians to calculate values of
ez and of trigonometric functions of z where z is a complex number. Of
course, this required mathematicians to revise their understanding of what
these functions mean. It was precisely the ease of calculating the new values
that demanded this semantic revision. One of the characteristic features of
this period of mathematics is that calculating practice ran ahead of the
semantics, so that there were (in Serfati’s terms) ‘meaningless forms’, that
is, mathematical expressions in use that no-one could explicate, let alone
define.
More interesting are cases where it is not possible to extend a function
simply by calculating values for arguments outside the original domain. In
these cases, Serfati identifies the following pattern: shift attention from the
4Cf. (Stedall, 2007, p. 399).
5Serfati (2005, pp. 262–266) traces this development in some detail, recording the in-
troduction of fractional (Newton), irrational (Leibniz) and imaginary (Euler) exponents.
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definition of the function to one or more of its trivial consequences. This
corollary may then serve as a definition of the new, expanded function,
or at least as a ‘bridge’ from the original restricted function to its new,
extended version. The difficult part is then to find a function on the new,
expanded domain that (a) satisfies this corollary of the original definition,
(b) coincides with the original function on the original domain, and (c)
does some useful mathematical work. Serfati offers several examples,6 the
earliest and simplest of which is Euler’s extension of the factorial function
from natural numbers to positive real numbers (Serfati, 2005, pp. 366–368).
As long as we concentrate on the definition of the factorial function, it seems
impossible to extend it beyond the natural numbers. However, Euler found
a function that satisfies conditions (a), (b) and (c). But how?
In a letter to Goldbach7 of 1729, Euler observed that for a natural num-
ber m,
m! =
1 · 2m
1 +m
· 2
1−m · 3m
2 +m
· 3
1−m · 4m
3 +m
· . . . · n
1−m · (n+ 1)m
n+m
· . . . .
Euler’s guiding heuristic here is the use of infinite products. From this
equation, it is a short step to this:
x! = lim
n→∞
(
1 · 2 · . . . · n
(1 + x)(2 + x) . . . (n+ x)
(n+ 1)x
)
.
Euler explains in his letter that for natural numbers, this function coincides
with the factorial function, but it is also well-defined for fractions. Having
satisfied our condition (b), Euler then goes on to argue (c) (that this devel-
opment is mathematically worthwhile). In fact, in a slightly different guise,
this function becomes the Gamma function, so with hindsight we may agree
that (c) is satisfied.
In terms of Serfati’s pattern, the ‘bridge’ in this case between the original
factorial function and the extended version is the trivial fact that factorial
satisfies the functional equation g(x) = x g(x − 1). It is easy to see that
Euler’s new function satisfies this equation too. Call this function f(x).
6Factorial of a positive real number; Exponentiation by a complex number or square
matrix; Trigonometric functions of complex numbers; Matrix pseudo-inverses; Deriva-
tive of a non-differentiable function; Derivative of a function on normed vector-spaces;
Union and intersection of r-partitions (Serfati, 2005, pp. 366–376). The second and third
examples seem ill-chosen as there is no obvious ‘bridging’ identity.
7Enestro¨m number 00715. Quoted from (Fuss, 1843, pp. 3–7).
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Then:
f(x) = x lim
n→∞
(
1 · 2 · . . . · n
x(1 + x)(2 + x) . . . (n+ x)
(n+ 1)x
)
f(x) = x lim
n→∞
((
1 · 2 · . . . · n
x(1 + x)(2 + x) . . . (n+ x− 1)(n+ 1)
x−1
)
n+ 1
n+ x
)
f(x) = xf(x− 1) lim
n→∞
(
n+ 1
n+ x
)
= xf(x− 1)
Despite Serfati’s description of the case, Euler did not bother to make
this argument. Euler was certainly trying to extend the domain of the facto-
rial function, but he did not seem to be looking for a function that satisfies
the functional equation g(x) = x g(x − 1). Rather, his procedure was to
express the factorial function as an infinite product, and then observe that
he could calculate this product for fractional values of m. Certainly, it took
a moment of mathematical imagination to wonder what happens if m is a
fraction, and in this sense this case is like the extension of exponentiation
to irrational and complex values. However, we do not have mathematical
syntax operating ahead of the corresponding semantics as we had in the ear-
lier cases. By Euler’s time, addition and exponentiation were perfectly well
understood for fractional values, which is all that Euler’s infinite product
requires. Moreover (as Serfati mentions) Euler did not use the ! sign, which
Christian Kramp introduced in his work of 1808 (Serfati, 2005, p. 367n72).
Nor, in this letter, did Euler use any other symbol in its place. Rather,
he refers to this series, 1, 2, 6, 24, 120, etc. Serfati’s chapter is entitled
‘forms without meaning’ but there is no meaningless form here. Moreover,
the bridge Serfati identifies (the functional equation g(x) = x g(x−1)) does
not seem to have played any role in Euler’s thinking. The case certainly fits
Serfati’s ‘bridging’ pattern, but only in his post hoc analysis.
This case is almost three centuries old, and depends in its details on
a style of mathematics that now seems antique. What about Serfati’s
more up-to-date cases? I shall consider his fourth example of an exten-
sion, namely, matrix pseudo-inverses (Serfati, 2005, pp. 370–372). Serfati
considers two kinds of pseudo-inverse: Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverses and
pseudo-inverses defined using a norm on the space of matrices.
Serfati introduces this example by asking “Can we give a meaning to the
‘form’ A−1 if A stands for any matrix, that is to say, possibly not square or if
square, non-invertible?”8 Here again, we see Serfati trying to fit the example
8“Peut-on fournir une signification a` la ‘forme’ A−1, ou` A est le signe d’une ma-
trice complexe quelconque, c’est-a`-dire qui peut eˆtre non carre´e, ou bien carre´e non
inversible?”(Serfati, 2005, p. 370).
204 B. Larvor
into the seventeen-century mould of mathematicians using symbols without
really knowing what they mean. In fact, Penrose defines a new ‘form’, A†, to
stand for his new function, just as one would expect (Penrose, 1955, p. 407).
By the twentieth century, Leibniz’s attitude to mathematical symbols was
commonplace and no-one would bother to complain as Tschirnhausen did
about the introduction of a new symbol. Indeed, the separation of syn-
tax from semantics was complete in theory as well as in practice by the
end of the nineteenth century. Consequently, mathematicians seeking to
introduce a new concept have no reason to do so surreptitiously by abusing
the symbol for an already existing notion. The ‘meaningless form’ aspect
of Serfati’s analysis sits even less happily with the case of Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverses than it does with the Euler factorial.
On the other hand, Penrose’s paper does illustrate the pattern that
Serfati identifies in these extensions: using a trivial consequence of the
original definition as a ‘bridge’ to extend the function to a wider domain.
In this case, the bridge consists of four trivial identities. For any invertible
matrix A, where A∗ is the conjugate transpose, or adjoint of A:
AA−1A = A
A−1AA−1 = A−1
(AA−1)∗ = AA−1
(A−1A)∗ = A−1A
These four identities follow immediately from the definition of the in-
verse, and from the fact that the identity matrix is its own adjoint. At the
outset of his paper, Penrose proves by construction that for every matrix A
there is a unique matrix X such that:
AXA = A
XAX = X
(AX)∗ = AX
(XA)∗ = XA
That is to say, for every matrix A there is a unique matrix X that plays
the role of an inverse in these four identities. Having proved the existence
and uniqueness of this X, Penrose labels it A† and proceeds to prove corol-
laries and show applications. As this is a formal, published proof rather
than a private letter, Penrose gives no account of how he chose just these
four identities to serve as a bridge, nor of how he arrived at his construc-
tion. Examination of the proof does suggest some plausible guesses; Penrose
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derives the pseudo-inverse from the fact that A∗A, (A∗A)2, (A∗A)3, etc.
cannot be linearly independent (rather than simply introducing it as a deus
ex machina in the sense of Polya, 1954, volume II, Patterns of Plausible
Inference, p. 148). These hints aside, the proof does not expose its heuristic
background. In its proof at least, this case does follow Serfati’s ‘bridging’
pattern. However, given the complexity of the construction it seems unlikely
that Penrose first somehow selected the four trivial identities and then later
went in search of something that would satisfy them in the general case.
Serfati further illustrates the ‘bridging’ pattern with matrix pseudo-
inverses of another kind, which use norms defined on the space of matrices.
Given such a norm, it follows from definitions that for any invertible matrix
A, this trivial identity holds: ‖AA−1 − I‖ = 0 This serves as the bridge.
However, in this case, we cannot simply replace A−1 by X (as in the Moore-
Penrose case), because ‖AX − I‖ = 0 has solutions only if A is invertible.
However, for any non-zero complex matrix A there is a unique matrix X
such that ‖AX − I‖ is minimal. Thus by loosening the condition a little,
we can define X as the right-hand pseudo-inverse of A. As with the Moore-
Penrose pseudo-inverse, it seems unlikely that the bridging condition came
first. Indeed, whenever we find this pattern, we should expect the choice
of bridging condition to be informed by some effective heuristic (the use of
infinite products in the case of Euler; linear dependency of the (A∗A)n in
the Moore-Penrose case and perhaps the presence of rounding errors in the
case of the second kind of pseudo-inverse).9
Serfati’s ‘bridging’ pattern is objectively present in the cases he de-
scribes, but (for the reason just given) it cannot function as a heuristic
in the sense of Polya or Lakatos. ‘Look for a bridge to a useful general func-
tion’ is hardly a helpful hint. Rather, the pattern that Serfati identifies in
these cases is more like a ‘dialectical structure’ in something like the sense
of Lautman. That is to say, it is objectively present in the mathematics but
discernible only post hoc (Lautman, 2006, especially pp. 228–9). In respect
of heuristic usefulness, Serfati’s pattern contrasts with the case of syntac-
tic analogy. These two patterns also contrast in respect of mathematical
tractability. While it may be possible to articulate the syntactic analogy
pattern in mathematical terms, this seems less likely in the case Serfati’s
pattern.
3 Structures in practice
One of the obvious ways in which mathematics differs from other sciences is
the freedom that mathematicians have to invent new mathematical objects.
In mainstream philosophy of mathematics, this is often understood as a
freedom to investigate whichever axiom-systems seem interesting. That
9I am grateful to Thomas Mu¨ller for this last suggestion.
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is to say, insofar as philosophy of mathematics treats mathematics as a
collection of axiomatic systems, the mathematician’s freedom seems limited
to the moment when the axioms are chosen. The choice of axioms fixes
the theorems; thereafter the task is to identify them correctly. Finding and
proving the theorems may take ingenuity, but the possibility of creating
radically new mathematics has passed.
In practice, not all of mathematics is axiomatised and even where there
are axioms, these do not prevent mathematicians from creating new mathe-
matics (Rav, 1999, pp. 15-19).10 Serfati’s examples of functional extensions
remind us that the creation of new mathematics is rarely a matter of choos-
ing axioms. Rather, the growth of mathematics (in these cases) depended
on shrewd choices of ‘bridge’. These choices are constrained by the re-
quirement that the new function should coincide with the old one on the
original, restricted domain, and that it should lead to some insight or use-
ful application. Nevertheless, as we saw in the case of the pseudo-inverses,
these constraints do not always pick out a unique candidate. On such occa-
sions, the mathematician is free to make a judgment. Freedom of invention
distinguishes mathematics from most other sciences, but we get a better
understanding of the scope and character of that freedom by attending to
examples such as these than by reflecting on a foundationalist conception
of mathematics as the investigation of ‘interesting’ axiom systems. ‘Inter-
esting’ makes mathematical decisions sound like exercises of taste, when in
fact they are more likely to be exercises of shrewdness (which is not to say
that taste plays no role in mathematics). At the outset, I gathered heuristic
in the senses of Polya and Lakatos; principles in the sense of Cassirer; ideas
in the sense of Lautman and notions in the sense of Grattan-Guinness under
the umbrella-term ‘enabling structures’. What these structures—and pat-
terns such as Serfati’s functional extension—enable is mathematical growth
that is free but not random. For philosophers, these patterns enable us to
explicate for particular cases the meaning of terms like ‘tasteful’, ‘shrewd’
and ‘interesting’.
Our first example was Leibniz’s appeal to notational symmetry in his
discovery of the formula for repeated differentiation of a product. Here too,
the philosophy of mathematical practice can claim an advantage over philo-
sophical approaches directed at ‘foundational’ questions. The thought that
mathematics is a science of patterns (to take up the title of Resnik’s 1997
book) or that mathematical objects are structures (as argued in Shapiro’s
work also of 1997) is attractive and plausible to anyone with experience
of doing mathematics. However, this plausibility depends in part on cases
such as this, in which structure or pattern plays a heuristic role. That
10Cf. also (Corfield, 1997) and (Corfield, 2003, p. 166). This is not to suggest that
axiomatisation is never productive or heuristically valuable. Cf. (Schlimm, 2010).
Syntactic analogies and impossible extensions 207
is to say, the study of mathematical practice can account for some of the
philosophical intuitions that guide philosophical enquiries that are remote
from the practice-oriented approach.11 Resnik and Shapiro both turn to
mathematical practice to explain how a science of patterns is possible, but
only as a supplement to their metaphysical arguments. Having argued for
structuralism as a metaphysical thesis, they have to supply a correspond-
ing epistemology. Their question is, how is it possible to make discoveries
about structures? By contrast, the Leibniz case prompts us to ask, how do
structures (in particular, syntactic structures) help us to make discoveries?
Structures can play heuristic roles in empirical science, but in the Leibniz
case (and in umbral calculus more generally), syntactic structure plays a
role unique to mathematics.
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